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Abstract 
A review of the volume; an appraisal of the anthropology of Britain as a project. 
An argument is made along Kierkegaardian lines. Human life is an inward, 
personal adventure, of each in the face of the other: life is individual and 
possessed of infinite depth. Conducting social-scientific research (whether 
‘anthropological’ or ‘sociological’) in a language—verbal, gestural and 
conventional—with which the researcher is ‘at home’ enables that individual 
and inward life, and its public and social dimensions, to be apprehended with a 
subtlety and sophistication far more difficult to acquire in ‘foreign’ settings. 
Anthropology ‘at home’ is ideally placed to differentiate between the cultural 
forms of life, the social structures of life, and how these are individually 
inhabited and personally experienced. To do justice to human life—descriptive, 
analytic—is to apprehend an immensity—a complexity and contrariety—
beyond the delimitings of partial labels and categories, even beyond particular 
disciplines of study. 
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‘What are days for? 
Days are where we live’ 
Philip Larkin, from ‘Days’ 
 
 
On labels 
Labels are also where we live, in a way: ‘Britain’ and ‘Wales’, ‘Anthropology’ 
and ‘Sociology’. However, where we live only begins to address issues of how 
we live: the ‘where’ that such labels might seem to identify is a superficial one.  
 The ‘where’ that someone might ascertain—and assert—in the definition 
of ‘Nigel Rapport’—say, as an ‘anthropologist’ of ‘Welsh’ or ‘British’ (or 
‘Jewish’) extraction—is a place that feels remote from the ‘where’ that I know 
myself to come from and live in. It pertains to an exterior knowledge by which 
someone might categorise me and by this classification claim to identify me. 
Even should these labels of exterior classification be multiplied—‘Nigel 
Rapport’, who is also ‘male’, ‘White’, ‘married’ and ‘middle-class’, who 
‘supports Arsenal’, who works at ‘St Andrews University’—the knowledge 
remains a generalised one. Even should the labels be those I myself suggest—
‘Nigel Rapport’, who is an ‘atheist’, a ‘liberal’, a ‘Zionist’, and a lover of 
‘Bloomsbury’ fiction—the knowledge conveyed by the labels as such is 
superficial compared to the particularities and intimacies of interpretation by 
which I animate those labels and make them meaningful in my life. The use of 
labels represents a dialectic between their external imposition and their internal 
inhabitation. Existence, Kierkegaard (1941, p.118) observed, is an inward, 
personal adventure of each in the face of the other: life is individual and 
possessed of infinite depth.  
 What precisely might this imply for the disciplinarity of ‘anthropology’ 
and ‘sociology’? The intent of this volume, eloquently enunciated by Cathrine 
Degnen and Katharine Tyler, is to challenge and disrupt traditional notions of 
the two disciplines—in particular the notion that an ‘anthropology of Britain’ is 
simply the practice of social anthropology ‘at home’—and to interrogate a 
history of relations in British academe of ‘studied indifference’: anthropology 
and sociology being closely related yet persistently estranged. Should we not re-
consider their relations as mutually constitutive?  
 A first response, then, can be to assert the personal nature of these labels 
for their (internal) professional exponents. In this spirit, I might further offer the 
interpretations below as being, for me, key. ‘Sociology’, according to Georg 
Simmel (1971, pp. 27, 32), discloses how: 
 
‘[s]ociety exists where a number of individuals enter into 
interaction; society is interaction. (…) A description of a 
social situation is an exercise in psychological knowledge’. 
 
The definition is elaborated by Herbert Blumer (1972, pp. 182, 186): 
 
‘Instead of the individual being surrounded by an 
environment of pre-existing objects which play on him and 
call forth his behaviour, the proper picture is that he 
constructs his objects on the basis of his ongoing activity. 
(…) Human society consists of acting people and the life of 
the society is to be seen as consisting of their actions’. 
 
And finally by Jack Douglas (1977, pp. xiv-xv): 
 
‘There is no community, no constraint, no power, when 
individuals do not build them and maintain them. (…) 
Everyone knows immediately that he is a mass of complex, 
conflicting, momentarily changing feelings, and that is 
where he lives’. 
 
As for the label ‘anthropology’, from Anthony Cohen (1994, pp. 146, 180) I 
hear that: 
 
‘Society is constituted by self consciousness and 
substantiated by the meanings which conscious selves 
impute to those received forms. (…) We must make 
deliberate efforts to acknowledge the subtleties, inflections 
and varieties of individual consciousness which are 
concealed by the categorical masks which we have invented 
so adeptly.’ 
 
And then from Tim Ingold (2015, p. 342): 
 
If anthropology stands for anything, it is for the idea that 
human life cannot be sliced up into discrete layers 
[psychological, social, biological], for separate study by 
different disciplines[:] anthropology is the study of human 
being and becoming, as it were, ‘in the round’.’ 
 
Finally, I arrive at my own conclusion (Rapport, 2003, p. 75): 
 
‘Anthropology is the study of the manifold—direct and 
indirect, intended and unintended—effects that human 
beings as individual, energetic things-in-the-world have 
upon one another.’ 
 
It seems that the labels ‘sociology’ and ‘anthropology’ can be in habited in such 
a way that the different terms indicate different histories of institutionalization 
rather than anything essentially substantive. Each may be said to concern the 
individual construction and experience of social milieux and cultural traditions, 
disclosing that sociocultural circumstance where human beings as individual 
centres-of-energy (driven by their own metabolisms, within distinct 
embodiments, possessing unique histories of conscious activity-in-the-world) 
impact on one another’s lives. 
 
On experience 
Certainly, this accords with my own research experience, beginning in the rural 
farming (and tourist-focused) dale of ‘Wanet’ in north-west England. In Diverse 
World-Views in an English Village (1993) I examined the way in which beneath 
the cover of the common symbolic forms of daily exchange, individual villagers 
were set apart in worlds whose environmental features and landmarks, identities 
and meaning, were of their own creation. It was as if each occupied their own 
cultural space, while conducting social relations with one another by virtue of 
words and behaviours that were intrinsically ambiguous: the symbolic was 
subject to interpretation that was necessarily, individual, personal and private in 
nature. There was also a sense in which individual villagers were set apart from 
themselves, for each did not only inhabit one world-view but several, in each of 
which not only the environing world was different but they were too: as if 
different people, speaking with different voices, holding different values, with 
different expectations. When different villagers—Sid and Doris, say (the builder 
and the farmer for whom I worked)—conversed together the effect was chaotic: 
not only Sid and Doris talking past each other, using the same words to mean 
subtly different and often incompatible things, but Sid and Doris also talking 
past themselves, as different versions of themselves pursued each other across 
the conversational space, within the ‘same’ symbolic forms. In the apparently 
small and homogeneous social setting of an English village, those born and bred 
there as well as those newly arrived retirees, second-home owners and tourists 
occupied not one culture but a plethora, as a multiplicity of private contexts 
collided, and individuals construed world-views and life-projects that owed 
their nature and their content not to what was externally derived or imposed—
by way of community, profession or class, discourse or habitus, nationality or 
ethnicity, religion or gender—but to what was personally invented.  
 This being the nature of social reality in Wanet, how was it best 
represented? In The Prose and the Passion: Anthropology, Literature and the 
Writing of E. M. Forster (1994), I wondered how the case of literature—in 
particular the ‘social novelist’—might allow anthropology better to come to 
terms with the subtleties of its own data, doing justice to life’s personalism, 
complexity, transitoriness, diversity, ambiguity, distortion and depth. The key 
was creativity: of informants who made individual lives for themselves, and of 
their anthropologists who might transmute an experience of that individuality 
into authentic, ‘crafted’ accounts. 
 
On category-thinking  
I recognise however, mutatis mutandis, that the ‘humanistic’ or ‘existential’ or 
‘cosmopolitan’ or even ‘liberal’ way in which I might justify having inhabited 
the labels ‘anthropology’ and ‘sociology’ need not correspond to others’, whose 
orientation may instead be ‘functionalist’ or ‘structuralist’ or ‘post-structuralist’, 
‘Marxian’, ‘Foucauldian’ or ‘Geertzian’, and so forth. But the lesson to be 
drawn, as I understand it, concerns the dangers and delimitings of ‘category-
thinking’. The categorial label is not the extent of the existence it purports to 
identify and know; the label may barely scratch the surface of the conscious 
experience it classifies. While ‘anthropology’ and ‘sociology’, and ‘British’, 
‘Welsh’, ‘Jewish’, ‘atheist’, have the convenience of appearing to order the 
world cleanly and definitively, personal consciousness nevertheless escapes: in 
its singularity, its complexity, and its fluidity.  
This was further brought home to me in a later period of participant-
observation, working as a porter at Constance Hospital, in the Scottish city of 
‘Easterneuk’ (published as Of Orderlies and Men: Hospital Porters Achieving 
Wellness at Work (Rapport, 2008)). Some 130 porters were employed at 
Constance, a large state-funded teaching hospital with a total workforce of 
thousands. Not being medically trained, the porters occupied a somewhat lowly 
position in the organization; portering tasks—ferrying patients across the 
hospital, delivering mail, transporting body parts, bodily substances and dead 
bodies—called for physical stamina more than any other skill. However, while 
much social interaction appeared hierarchical, in their lodge (or ‘buckie’), two 
cramped rooms below the level of the main hospital concourse, the porters kept 
up a commentary on life—the hospital, the wider Easterneuk world, one 
another—whose ethos was critical and humorous. Their commentary called into 
question so-called expert claims to status, skill and even identity. Being ‘a man’ 
(all but two of the porters were male) was surely an easily identifiable matter, 
and ‘manliness’ supervened upon the conceits of academic medicine with its 
fetish for rank, class and ritual: Constance Hospital’s world of work was surely 
insignificant in the context of a man’s life of fun, ‘crack’, joking, drinking, 
fighting, sex and football. The routine in which the porters partook while 
working at Constance Hospital, including the massification that the label and 
the category ‘porter’ conveyed, may not one that they escaped at work but it 
was one that they were not responsible for inhabiting and animating according 
to their own (diverse) wills. The porters skirted creatively and ludically around 
this (and other) labels that might seek to define them: skilled in the labels’ use 
and also abuse; above all, remaining tricksy with regard to which might 
truthfully apply to themselves, as individuals and as members of a professional 
group—if anything at all. 
 
On expertise 
Given the irreducible personalism of consciousness, it is always an imposition 
(in all senses of that word: presumptuous; an assertion of power; often 
unwelcome) to perceive the human world categorially rather than attempting to 
know its individual centres-of-energy in their own terms (Rapport, 2012). The 
most difficult thing is also the most necessary thing: to aspire to an 
understanding of the individual other and then do justice representationally to 
that otherness: to find the symbolic forms that do not compromise and corrupt 
‘the subtleties, inflections and varieties’ of individual conscious selfhood. To 
return to the exhortations of Anthony Cohen (1978, p. 450): woolly generic 
categories like ‘society’, ‘culture’, ‘class’, ‘The British’, ‘Women’, whether 
externally imposed or self-imposed, entail reductions to lowest common 
denominators of identity; individuals appear merely as components or fractals 
of larger collective entities whose characters they embody. This is an unsubtle 
and erroneous accounting of consciousness—and hence of the social and 
cultural worlds to which self conscious individuals give rise. Common symbolic 
forms, labels and categories do not betoken common meanings. It is necessary 
to ‘treat societies, cultures, as barely generalizable aggregations of difference 
rather than as fictive matrices of uniformity’ (Cohen, 1993, p. 213). 
 The references to Anthony Cohen are not incidental, given his seminal 
role in encouraging an anthropology of Britain (1982, 1986, 1987). Which 
returns us to the issue of the distinctiveness of that anthropology—or 
sociology—of Britain. What can we expect to achieve as, under the direction of 
Cathrine Degnen and Katharine Tyler, this distinct area of inquiry looks 
outward, geographically and also interdisciplinarily? What specific 
ethnographic, theoretic, philosophic and social-policy insights do we hope to 
provide?  
 The bullish proposition with which I warranted my own edited collection 
in 2002, British Subjects, was that an anthropology ‘at home’ in Britain had the 
potential merit and significance to make it paradigmatic of disciplinary 
concerns. All that was human could be discerned and interrogated in Britain, 
while its study could potentially set the disciplinary standard for sensitive 
ethnography and for complex analysis alike. My argument concerned 
competency (rather than any essentialistic notion of ‘cultural belonging’). An 
anthropologist thoroughly at home in British linguistic denotation, with an 
expertise in the formulaicism and normative proprieties of cultural forms of 
interaction, was potentially more able to sensitize themselves to the connotative: 
to pick up clues concerning what lay beneath the surfaces of exchange, to 
appreciate its ambivalences and ambiguities, and thus to gain access to the most 
intimate, intricate and significant aspects and levels of being-in a sociocultural 
milieu and being-with others (Rapport 2002, pp. 6-8). 'Si bis faciunt idem non 
est idem’ (‘If two people do the same thing it is not the same thing’) is the 
Classical aphorism (as cited by George Devereux (1978, p. 125)) that might be 
taken as a shorthand for the complex realities of human social life: the radical 
distinction between surfaces and depth (public and private, exteriority and 
interiority) that provides sociality with its fundamental character. A cultural-
cum-linguistic competency enables the researcher who is ‘at home’ in British 
milieux to reach beyond the surface of cultural categories, labels and classes to 
individual and human depths. One discerns and discloses the dynamics of how 
the show of cultural forms, the surface, is existentially inhabited and socially 
enacted. 
 
The volume 
The work contained in the present volume significantly extends this tradition of 
‘expertise’. To rehearse it in brief, Cathrine Degnen and Katharine Tyler’s 
work on ‘intersectionality’ and ‘intersection’ in English mining communities 
(and in British academe) resonates with the Gluckmanian concept of ‘cross-
cutting ties’, as incisively applied to the fishing communities of Lewis by Peter 
Mewett (1982). In an individual life a range of discursive regimes and labels 
can meet. In contemporary Britain, people may find themselves positioned 
according to questions of nationhood, race and ethnicity, post-colonialism and 
post-industrialism, regionality and migration, social class, age and gender, the 
environment—and academic disciplinarity. These can each convey a different 
stigmatisation and inequality: their intersecting and cross-cutting give rise to 
subtly unique instances of disadvantaging and discrimination. 
 Alexander Smith’s examination of the meaning of Britishness in relation 
to ‘the Scottish Question’ recalls Susan Lewis’s (2002) account of the ‘national 
identity’ and freedom from ‘colonialism’ that are espoused on the Isle of Man in 
celebrating a ‘National Day’. ‘Britain’ is contested space, not simply a site to 
know, and, in the wake of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, 
undertaking an ‘Anthropology of Britain’ is also a political work; those who 
reckon themselves non-British now reside within the borders of the United 
Kingdom. For Smith, the conditions of knowing ‘Britain’ and identifying 
‘Britishness’ are shaped by a relation with otherness: British subjects here vis-à-
vis British subjects elsewhere (and in former colonies) and also ‘non-British 
subjects’. An ‘anthropology of Britain’ concerns a de-territorialised site of the 
imagination rather than a taken-for-granted geography. 
 Laura Jeffery’s reflection on the agency of members of the extended 
Chagossian community—displaced forcibly from the British Overseas Territory 
of the Chagos Islands—echoes the efforts of Allison James (2002) to disinter 
the hidden agency of children, equally constructed as a dependent population, 
yet authors of their own lifeworlds. Jeffery highlights the way in which, from 
homes in Crawley, Manchester and London, the migrants construe their 
displacement both in terms of their victimhood and their choice. Their 
experience reverberates as forced and voluntary, reactive and proactive, 
depending on political purpose and personal situation. 
 Gillian Evans registers the social and cultural dynamics of inequality with 
which the English working class is faced. Her identifying of a sociality, value-
set and scheme of action that resist rather than accept what the middle and upper 
classes might legitimate as ‘culture’ calls to mind the work of Ronald 
Frankenberg (1957) in the slate-mining and farming village of Pentrediwaith. 
For Frankenberg, men and women were locally divided, culturally, due to the 
differential extents of their integration in the wider English-speaking industrial 
economy. For Evans, British classes are culturally divided on the basis of 
distinct investments in the discourse of multiculturalism. The appeal of the 
BNP, and now UKIP, is a kind of cultural nationalism that demands recognition 
for the neglected ‘indigenous people of England’: the working class 
reconfigures itself as distinctly white, and thus invents a new, resistant political 
collective. 
 Insa Koch’s work on a council estate in south-east England focuses on 
voting, and how formal electoral processes thought to be central to the 
functioning of Britain as a democracy are increasingly eschewed by those who 
see themselves—instead—as members of the-housing-estate-as-collectivity. 
Loyalty to this socially and economically deprived space demands ‘disloyalty’ 
or active distantiation from an ‘a-social’ national politics, politicians and 
political media. One recalls Saugestad Larsen’s (1982) work on the legitimation 
of religious communities in Northern Ireland through their ‘performative 
positioning’ relative to larger, apparently external, political structures. It is local 
networks of support and care to which affective relations belong.  
 Katherine Smith’s account of life on a Manchester housing estate evinces 
a different kind of agency. To live in Harpurhey is both to ‘be poor’ and attend 
the Job Centre—to be the ‘worthy person’, as defined in governmental social 
policy, who would achieve independence from welfare benefits—but also to ‘be 
fair’: to partake in a discourse which recognises, in a cosmopolitan way, the 
human identity and individual agency of all. One performs ‘being poor’ for 
functional ends and one performs ‘being fair’ as acts of transcendence of any 
social categorization. Reminiscent of Andrew Irving’s (2010) work on the 
‘everyday’ morality of living with HIV/AIDS—while marginal to a more 
conventional and normative life-course—Smith describes a moral economy of 
‘fairness’ surviving scarcity, austerity and uncertainty about the future. The 
discourse serves to cement notions of personal dignity as well as a belonging 
and interdependency that speak to a broader humanity. 
 Sarah Winkler-Reid’s account of notions of ‘success’ among teenage 
pupils in a secondary school in London, and of a diversity of ways in which 
‘doing one’s best’ is successfully articulated even within a supposedly 
hegemonic, ‘neoliberal’ auditory framework, echoes Colin Lacey’s (1970) 
ethnography of a Manchester grammar school. Lacey disclosed how the 
‘system’ of class hierarchy in the school and the wider society appeared to 
predispose ‘working-class’ pupils to relative educational failure: the significant 
variable, however, was the extent to which individuals were prepared, 
psychologically, to be satisfied with lower attainment. Winkler-Reid describes 
how ‘everyday actions exceed and cut across discursive formations that insist 
on comparison and grading’: notions of the incommensurate worth of individual 
pupils were emphasised by the school, foregrounding different aspects of 
identity and relationality, and instantiating relations of care. 
 Richard Irvine’s work on the different—contested and conflicting—
temporalities in whose terms human life can be seen as being lived chimes with 
Malcolm Chapman’s (1992) critical interrogation of the contested temporality 
surrounding the construction of ‘Celtic’ identity, and its supposed continuity 
and longevity. For Irvine, the ‘fenland’ of East Anglia, land transformed from 
sea and shifting marsh, has a time-depth that warrants local notions of the 
‘Anthropocene’—of an  anthropogenic landscape—but this also serves to 
obscure a longer term record of flux. There is a temporal disjuncture between 
the anthropogenesis of the fenland and ‘deep time’—the geological history 
whose temporal horizons dwarf the drainage ditches and fields—wherein the 
fens have ‘always’ been ‘temporary land’. 
Lastly, Andrew Whitehouse’s writing on environmental phenomenology 
and how British bird sounds resonate with people’s senses of wellbeing in 
places, times and seasons, recalls John Gray’s (2000) work on how shepherds 
are ‘at home in the hills’. For Gray, hill-sheep fuse people, space and way of life 
together as a kind of being-in-place; for Whitehouse birds and their sounds, in 
an ongoing cycle of presence and absence, give rise to a human dynamic of how 
particular activities, seasons and times of day are habitually experienced. 
Hearing birds is part of an ‘emergent experiential aesthetics’: lives, activities 
and space drawn together in ‘authentic’ ways, both locally appropriate and 
ethical.  
 
Envoi 
And the volume points forwards again. Disciplines like anthropology and 
sociology might intersect, Degnen and Tyler argue, so as to provide an 
emergent engagement with human social life: grounded theory (anthropology) 
plus applied theory (sociology); proceeding from particular to universal 
(anthropology) and from global to local (sociology), sensitive to cultural forms 
of life (anthropology) and to institutional structures (sociology).  
Urging such ‘blurring of genres’ has been a provocation since the 1980s’ 
‘Writing Culture’ debate (Geertz 1983); indeed, Gregory Bateson (1959) was 
proposing even before that the ‘delimitation of disciplines’ (through labels such 
as ‘psychology’, ‘sociology’ and ‘history’) be seen as a ‘tragic error’ if the aim 
was to apprehend the immensity of human experience: its ‘vast intricacy’, 
complexity and contrariety. ‘Everything human endlessly resolves itself in 
contradiction’, Kierkegaard observed (1958, pp. 117-8). It is in this case that 
epistemological pluralism—deploying together a diversity of understandings of 
the human condition—and representational pluralism—practising manifold 
ways of inscribing the human—surely offer the best means available to 
elucidate a human nature and its individual substantiations (Rapport 1997).  
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RUBBISH 
 
They might elaborate how from the moment the individual energy source begins 
moving in its environment (in the womb) and becoming itself, a unique history 
of embodiment, of worldly engagement, unfolds and grows which compasses its 
own logics, its own habits, its own ways of doing and being, and its own 
purposes. Each human being will react to other things-in-the-world in ways that 
are not determinable: how each will affect others is difficult, if not impossible, 
to predict. For three reasons: first, because each is set upon its own life-course, 
each engaged in furthering a life-world, a ‘life-project’, whose direction and 
logic has been distinct from the moment 'it' began. Second, because each 
engages with others from the position of outsider: each is dependent on bodily 
sense-making apparatuses which are discrete and distinctive to itself and which 
imbue it with its own perspective on the world and no other. And third, because 
the sense-making procedures of each is characterized by a creativity—even 
randomness or gratuitousness—which makes their generation of perspectives 
unpredictable even to themselves (cf. Rapport, 2001, 2008a). 
 
——(2001) ‘Random Mind: Towards an Appreciation of Openness in  
 Individual, Society and Anthropology’, The Australian Journal of  
 Anthropology, 12(2): 190-220. 
——(2008a) ‘Gratuitousness: Notes towards an Anthropology of Interiority’,  
 The Australian Journal of Anthropology, 19(3): 331-49. 
 
‘Threads snap’: On representing an anthropology of Britain 
 The following extract comes not from a Forster text but an Oscar Wilde 
one, The Picture of Dorian Gray. (Wilde is similarly, I would posit, a writer of 
British auto-ethnography.) Here, Dorian witnesses a conversation between the 
Duke and Duchess of Monmouth, ‘Henry’ and ‘Gladys’, that turns to the nature 
of identity, both national and individual (Wilde 1965:486-7). Henry discloses 
his dislike of labels, protesting: ‘From a label there is no escape!’. Gladys 
retorts: 
 
‘“You don’t like your country, then?” she asked. 
“I live in it.” 
“That you may censure it better.” (…) She shook her head. “I 
believe in the race,” she cried. 
“It represents the survival of the pushing.” 
“It has development.” 
“Decay fascinates me more.” 
“What of Art?” she asked. 
“It is a malady.” 
“Love?” 
“An illusion.” 
“Religion?” 
“The fashionable substitute for Belief.” 
“You are a sceptic.” 
“Never! Scepticism is the beginning of faith.” 
“What are you?” 
“To define is to limit.” 
“Give me a clue.” 
“Threads snap. You would lose your way in the labyrinth.”’ 
 
The wariness with regard to definition—the warning that ‘threads snap’ when it 
is expected that an individual can be followed along an easily traceable, external 
line of character—I bear in mind when offering the ethnographic extract below. 
 Amid a busy buckie, Arthur begins a conversation with Steve, one of the 
small number of English porters employed at Constance. One of Steve’s major 
pastimes outside work is golf, including organising golfing trips abroad for his 
gang of drinking mates, for whom he acts as unofficial treasurer: 
 
Steve saunters into the buckie ostentatiously counting a wad of 
banknotes in his hand. 
Arthur: ‘Cor blimey!’ 
Steve: ‘No! I say, “Watch it mush”. I’m not from south London, so 
don't confuse me with that lot… It’s bad enough being from London!’ 
Arthur: ‘It’s bad enough being from England!’ 
Steve: ‘Don't start, now! Nor you, Spike-Head [Steve indicates 
Arthur’s friend, Michael (who sports a crew-cut, and who has broken 
into a grin)]’. 
Arthur [putting on a cockney accent]: ‘You South London wanker! 
Walthamstow wanker!’ 
Steve turns his attention again to his wad of notes: ‘That's £210!’ 
Oliver [with a note of jealousy in his voice]: ‘A bit dangerous 
carrying that on you by the front-door corridor of the Hospital on a 
Wednesday!’ 
Steve: ‘No one will take this off me! None of you boys could take it 
off me [the watching group of porters remains silent]… Cos I'd set 
you onto them, Oliver!’ [He laughs] 
Oliver [grinning]: ‘Aye: for a small fee!’ 
Steve: ‘Yeah, £210!’ 
 
What strikes me in this extract is the way that Arthur and Steve, similarly to 
Oscar Wilde’s character Henry, show ambivalence towards the definitions that 
labels convey. In Henry’s case the labels concerned ‘scepticism’, ‘religion’, 
‘art’, ‘love’, ‘country’ and ‘race’. Between Arthur and Steve they are ‘London’, 
‘south London’, ‘Walthamstow’, ‘England’ and ‘wanker’. But the porters 
practice their ambivalence differently to Henry. As well as distancing 
themselves from certain labels, they energetically impose them on others. Arthur 
would have Steve as a cockney, a wanker, English—all of which, he implies, 
are remote from who he is. Steve disparages those from south London, and even 
London (now that he has moved north); also those ‘boys’ who do not have wads 
of banknotes to carry round, nor the strength to remove them from those who 
have, and who finally, it is implied, will not be party to the spending of the 
money. Most significantly, however, I feel that ‘threads snap’: that who Steve 
and Arthur present themselves as being has as much a labyrinthine character to 
it as was the case with Henry. There is no essentialism here in the claims made 
either regarding self or other. Arthur’s disparaging of Steve as ‘other’ is, then, 
playful because they are also workmates and both are residents of Easterneuk. 
Arthur’s intoning of ‘Cor blimey’ and ‘Walthamstow wanker’—as with Steve’s 
designation of ‘Spike-Head’—are also manifestations of intimate knowledge 
and appreciations of individuality. Steve’s ostentatious monetary display is also 
a request for his fellow’s notice and valuing of their esteem, as well as a 
demonstration of trust: he is safe with them. Steve’s admission of ‘weakness’—
that being from London is bad enough—also signals his sense of security, as 
does his invitation to a diminutive Oliver to be his paid protector: weaknesses 
can be admitted here in the ‘backstage’ space of the buckie.  
 In short, the extract reveals Surely, the inappropriateness of these labels 
as defining anything essential about them, Steve and Arthur insinuate, equally 
applies to the categorization that would see them as simply and essentially 
‘porters’? 
Bailey, F. G. (ed.) (1971) Gifts and Poison, Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Envoi 
This is emancipatory in a political way as well as an epistemological one. The 
politicisation of identity that has accompanied globalisation—the assertions that 
‘cultures are not options’ (Parekh 1998:212), or other such communitarian 
claims—points up its own falsities. The need to assert so vehemently claims of 
essential membership by individuals of collective categories—ethnicities, 
religions, nations—is a kind of special pleading: vehemence born from 
desperation. It is increasingly clear that the individuals in movement across the 
globe are ontologically distinct from the communities that (in the politics of 
multiculturalism) are supposedly responsible for their identity and being. 
Parekh, B. (1998) ‘Cultural Diversity and Liberal Democracy’ in G. Mahajan  
 (ed.) Democracy, Difference and Social Justice, 202-27, Delhi: Oxford  
 University Press.  
 
 
